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Abstract 
 
Today the outside world is interesting to Russia as a source of technology, 
production factors and necessary goods and services, and as a market. Russia is 
interesting to the outside world as a source of specific goods (energy at first), as a 
market and as a source of income from investments. The main risks Russia is bearing 
in contacts with the outside world are the following: discrimination of Russian goods 
and Russian business in world markets; limits in access to the world financial market; 
sharpening competition with foreign business on  the Russian inside market; growing 
dependence of Russia from the world economy; immigration problems. 
The analysis of these problems provides the following conclusions. Russia 
needs to liberalize immigration and foreign investment conditions. It is necessary to 
support exporters and try to enhance comparative advantages by backing innovations 
and export diversification. It is worth to abolish artificial limits on import of 
demanded goods and services. 
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Russia and the Outside World:  Problems of Economic 
Adaptation 
Sergey Mitsek  
Introduction 
Adaptation to the world economy is a challenge for Russia. A sustainable 
program for the future development of the Russian economy should answer the 
following questions: 
• In what aspects the outside world is interesting to Russia? 
• What the outside world waits from Russia? 
• What risks does Russia bear in the interaction with the outside world? 
The answers to these questions may be the following. The outside world is 
interesting to Russia as: 
1. A source of production factors, technology at first, and capital and 
labor also1. 
2. A market for Russian goods and services. 
3. A source of goods and services2. 
Russia is interesting to the outside world as: 
1. A source of goods and services. 
2. A market. 
3. A source of income from investment3. 
 
As to risks Russia bears in the interactions with the outside world, it is 
worthwhile to indicate the following ones: 
1. Discrimination of Russian goods and business on the foreign markets. 
2. Insufficient access of Russian business to the world financial market.4 
                                                 
1
 We will analyze only these three factors here since Russia almost did not depend from the import of 
raw materials end energy. The share in Russian import is less than 4 % (see table 19 and more detailed 
data in [6]). 
2
 We do not touch here a quickly developing process of Russian companies’ expansion abroad. It is a 
new tendency and should be studied more accurately when we have more information. For discussion 
see Kommersant - DAILY, 2004, No. 186 and 2006, No. 26. 
3
 The process of Russian investments abroad is at the very beginning and does not have a serious 
influence on foreign economies and its share in Russian income is small. When it becomes mature, 
Russia also would be a source of capital to the outside world, and the latter – a source of investment 
income for Russia. . 
4
 In spite of the rapid growth of borrowing abroad Russian companies is still not a serious factor on the 
world financial markets. The main obstacles are lack of transparency, backward system of accounting 
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3. The sharpening competition of Russian business with the foreign one 
in some sectors of the Russian market. 
4. The growing dependence of Russia from the world economy and its 
“whims”. 
5. The immigration problem. 
Let us discuss all these issues in detail. 
1.  The outside world as a source of production factors 
1.1  The labor force 
The situation with the labor in Russia is characterized by Tables 1 and 1a. 
The share of young people has declined sharply in recent 10 years, and the 
demographists tell it will worsen further. The participation ratio has declined too. All 
these factors limit the future growth of the labor force in Russia. 
Besides, econometric estimates5 show a serious disequilibrium in the 
Russian labor market expressed in almost twofold excess of the marginal revenue on 
labor over average gross wages (see Table 2). Such conclusion is supported by the 
polls where 60 % of voters worry about low wages and only 1 % about 
unemployment.6 
The shortage in the Russian labor market is strengthened by its 
interregional disequilibrium. The data in Table 3 based on the production function 
estimated on the panel data for 65 Russian regions7 show a disparity between the ratio 
between the marginal revenue on labor and average wages and the level of net 
migration. The first factor is the largest one in Volga and Ural regions,8 but the 
second factor – in the Central federal district, in Moscow City at first.9 Such 
disequilibrium is a result, partly, of the restrictions imposed by local authorities and, 
partly, of high costs of migration and a shortage of housing. 
Econometric estimates show that increase of labor growth rates on 1 %10 
provides increase of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate by 0.6-0.7 % (see 
Table 4) and decrease of the inflation rate by 0.2 – 0.5 %. Just these figures show that 
Russia would need immigrants11 as labor force, especially in view of the fact that 
                                                                                                                                            
in the majority of companies and still negative image of Russia abroad. But this situation may also 
change in the nearest years. See Section 1.2 for discussion of these problems. 
5
 All econometric estimates mentioned without special references are based on econometric models 
elaborated by the author and published in [10]. 
6
 See Izvestia, 2006, February 2. In other words, people consider that it is easy to find a job but it is 
paid inadequately. 
7
 In years 2000-2003. 
8
 First of all,  in such oil production regions as Tumen, Samara, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan. 
9
 Of course, the results of Table 2 do not give a complete picture, as well, they do not touch 
intraregional migration, that is, mostly migration from villages and small towns to large cities of the 
same region. 
10
 Such acceleration can seem fantastic as the real rate was 0.77 % per year. But let us note that only in 
2005 Russian authorities issued about 550 thousands of job permissions for immigrants and about 3 
million of them work illegally. See Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 48. 
11
 Internal possibilities in increase of labor force are limited. 
The similar processes take place in Spain. The number of foreigners registered there increased from 
637 thousands to 3.7 million, or from 1.6 % to 9 % of Spanish population between 1998 and 2005. 
Immigrants in Spain, as in Russia, are ready to fulfill low-skilled and low paid jobs. The experts 
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immigrants often fulfill such job that Russian citizens refuse to do and for much lower 
wages.12 
1.2  Capital 
Russia still attracts relatively small amount of foreign investments. At the 
beginning of 2005 the accrued amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the 
Russian economy constituted 6.5 % of GDP.13 It is five times less than in other 
European emerging economies.14 In 2003-2004 the ratio of annual FDI was only 5 % 
to the gross profit in the Russian economy15 and only 1.5 % to GDP in comparison 
with 3.5 % in China.16 The ratio of foreign credits to credits of Russian banks was 
only 6 %.17 
The main reasons that prevent foreign investments in Russia are ranked 
in Table 5,18 though Table 6 demonstrates a gradual improvement of the situation with 
foreign investments. Some “strategic” sectors are still closed for foreigners. Another 
factor is fear of Russian business to loose control19 in investment processes. 
A growing problem for further capital attraction is large debts of Russian 
companies.20 Though the official state debt of the Russian Federation has decreased,21 
the state debt owned by private banks and companies has grown, especially the debt 
of private banks.22 
                                                                                                                                            
estimate a crucial input of immigrants into Spanish economic miracle. See Business Week, 2005, May 
30, for details. 
12
 This fact is important in the situation when the unemployment rate in Russia is rather high. Some 
estimates show that legalization of migration will bring $1.3 billion annually to the Russian budget. See 
Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 139. Russian political decision-makers should think how to make the 
legalization process less painful both to immigrants and to the society. 
13
 This is the estimate of the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD). See 
Kommersant - DAILY, 2005, No. 39. 
14
 This is the estimate of the Russian Committee for Support of Foreign Investment (CSFI) of the 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of the Russian Federation. See Kommersant - DAILY, 
2005, No. 39. But according to estimates of CSFI the situation is becoming better gradually in 2005-
2006. See Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 72. The question is this turn has a long-term perspective? 
15
 We refer to the author’s calculations based on the data from [6] and [1]. Attraction of foreign capital 
to Russia now is limited by the great capital outflow, but unanimously it demonstrates a large potential 
for growth when more friendly conditions for foreign investments will be created (see [16] for details). 
16
 Business Week, 2005, May 2. 
17
 This is the author’s calculations based on the data from [6] and [1]. 
18
 This ranking is compiled in accordance with foreign investors’ responds. 
19
 That is why, Russian companies are typically listing just 10 % to 30 % of their shares (see Business 
Week, 2005, May 30). 
20
 This is a reason why in the recent two years Russian companies rely more on equity financing in 
world markets. 
21
 Only in 2005 the debt decreased from the level of 114 billion to the level of $71 billion. The data is 
taken from [11], see also Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 66 and No. 96. 
22
 The debt of state-owned banks increased to $66.5 billion and the debt of state-owned non-financial 
companies – to $200 billion at the beginning of 2006. See Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 66; 
Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 96. In 2005 state banks and non-financial companies borrowed 
abroad more than 1/3 of the total borrowing of the Russian business. The Russian corporate bond 
market was worth around $30 billion in the middle of 2005 (see Business Week, 2005, May 30). At the 
same time, the share of private companies in Eurobond emission by Russia declined from 55 % in 2002 
г. to 15 % in 2005, see Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 66. This fact is an illustration of the process 
of crowding out of the Russian private capital by the state-owned capital from the world debt market 
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Table 7 demonstrates a problem of regional disequilibrium in attraction 
of foreign capital. There is data about 13 Russian regions that are the highest 
beneficiaries of foreign capital23 compared to 13 regions which have the first 
indicators in the marginal revenue on capital. We see that only 6 regions appear in 
both lists (7 regions with Moscow City). 
In spite of all problems Russia becomes more and more attractive for 
investments, especially in the field of consumer markets that are growing quickly.24 
Foreign capital is attracted by the large Russian market, high growth rates and rapid 
maturation of the economy, large volume of the human capital25 and natural 
resources.26 Other factors are development of a thriving business outside the energy 
industry, improved corporate transparency and a pressing need for cash to maintain 
high growth rates and acquisitions inside the country and abroad. Russian labor rules 
are not as rigid as in Western Europe, and profitability of many Russian industries is 
high (see below Table 28).27 The share of the Russian Federation in new investment 
projects is about 7 % of the world investment market28 that is the third place after 
China and the USA.29 Since 2003 FDI in Russia grew very quickly30 and if these rates 
would double31 the GDP growth would increase by 0.5-0.6 %, but inflation would 
increase by 1.5-2.0 % (see Table 4).32 
Foreign capital is important for Russia because of shortage of its own 
savings (see Table 8). While in 1989 the gross investment in Property, Plant and 
Equipment (PP&E) was about 1/3 of GDP it declined to 15 % in 1995 and about to 20 
% of GDP in 2004 (see Table 9). Householders’ savings also have negative dynamics. 
                                                 
23
 Together they attract 89 % of all foreign investments in Russia. 
24
 It is important to note that many new investment projects belong not to the energy sector. This 
circumstance makes these projects less subjected to fluctuations of world energy prices. For example, 
“Coca-Cola” plans to take over the “Multon” company based in St. Petersburg that controls about 25 % 
of Russian juice market. Another example is a successful Initial Public Offering (IPO) of AFK 
“Sistema”, the holding of mobile telephone operator MTS, on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 
2005. Its $1.56 listing was oversubscribed by 2.6 times (see Business Week, 2005, May 23). In May 
2005 one of Russian largest supermarket networks “Pyaterochka” issued $598 million in shares on 
LSE. 
25
 See the answers of investors on CSFI questionnaire with details in Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 
72, and in Business Week, 2005, May 2 about first three factors. 
26
 Concerning perspectives of investments in the Russian energy sector see estimates of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). According to these estimates investments could constitute the 
amount of $900 billion over the coming 25 years. See Business Week 2005, May 23. 
27
 Partly it is a result of cheap labor and energy. 
28
 Let us note that the phase II of the “Shell”-led “Sakhalin” project calling for more than $10 billion is 
thought to be the biggest integrated oil and gas project ever undertaken. See Business Week 2005, May 
23. 
29
 See [17], P. 63. There are some significant examples of this process. Thus, in April 2005 “Toyota” 
declared an intend to build $150 million plant to manufacture “Toyota Camry” cars near St. Petersburg. 
“Ford”, “GM” and “Renault” companies already have plants in Russia. “Volkswagen” and 
“DaimlerChrysler” are also mulling investments in Russia. 
30
 For example, in the first half of 2005 eight Russian companies have entered the market with IPOs, 
half of them – on international stock exchanges, with the total value of $3.1 billion. That is three times 
bigger than the combined value of all Russian IPOs since 1995; see Business Week, 2005, May 30. The 
process of foreign investments in Russia is backed by world leading investment banks, such as 
“Morgan Stanley”, “Credit Suisse First Boston” (CSFB) and “Union Bank of Switzerland” (UBS). 
31
 This estimate is not fantastic. The recent data shows that in the first half of 2006 the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) Index increased by 40 %, and foreign credits increased 2.5 times in comparison with 
the same period of 2005. See Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 49; Izvestia, 2006, August 16. 
32
 Of course, if Russian finance authorities do not diminish it by active anti-inflation measures. 
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In 1989 they were 35 % of incomes33 but now are only 14-16 %, and only 30 % of 
them are invested into bank accounts or securities.34 The Russian underdeveloped 
bank sector is another reason of such situation.35 
Foreign capital is of great necessity for such strategic Russian industries 
as electric energy, gas and railroads. But to make them attractive to foreign capital the 
Russian government should abolish the policy of subsidized prices in these sectors 
and implement measures to support foreign investments.36 
1.3.  Technology 
The figures demonstrated backwardness of Russia in the field of modern 
technologies are given in Table 10, and there is no positive dynamics here (see Tables 
11 and 12). Annual expenditures on Research and Development (R&D) in Russia are 
only $4 billion, whereas $16 billion in China and $677 billion in the USA.37 The share 
of private R&D expenditures is less than 0.5 % of GDP in Russia, whereas almost 2 
% in the USA, Germany and Rep. of Korea and 2.5 % in Japan.38 The share of 
innovative companies39 is estimated between 10-20 %.40 
Russia occupies only 0.3-0.5 % of the world market of high technologies 
or about $5 billion.41 In 2004 Russia imported $1 billion of technologies from the 
OECD countries,42 but this is not enough for the decisive breakthrough. The World 
Bank put Russia only on the 11th place among Eastern European and NIS in the level 
of development of “knowledge economy”. The main reason is that country can not 
process scientific results in profitable products effectively.43 
The main obstacles to innovations have financial character, particularly, 
insufficient tax privileges,44 and lack of competition in different parts of the Russian 
                                                 
33
 See [13]. 
34
 See [15], P. 210 and [1]; author’s calculations. 
35
 It can be illustrated by the following figures. The five largest Russian banks have average assets of 
$30.5 billion per 1 bank (source [1], and author’s calculations) while four largest US banks have 
average assets of $463 per bank (source [4]); that is, the last figure is 15 times greater than the first one. 
36
 Let us have a look on results of the policy of disregard of foreign investments. The first IPO of a 
Russian company took place in 1996 (“Vimpelcom” – a mobile phone operator) and the second IPO – 
only in 2000 (“MTS”  – also a mobile phone operator). The third IPO was in 2002 (“Wimm-Bill-
Dunn” – a food processor). All of them took place on foreign financial markets. The first share issued 
by a private company on a local stock exchange took place only in 2002 (“RBC” – a media company). 
37
 Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 146. 
38
 Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No.165. 
39
 The company is considered “innovative” when it spends on R&D more than 5 % of its gross revenue. 
40
 Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 146, 165. A special question is an outsourcing of R&D that 
develops quickly now (see, for example, Business Week, 2005, March 21). That means that we should 
concentrate not only on the share of R&D expenditures in GDP but on the efficiency of R&D, that is, 
the R&D/GDP ratio. 
41
 Kommersant - DAILY, 2005, No. 212. 
42
 See [15], P.597. 
43
 Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No.165. Without a crucial breakthrough in the field of innovations 
Russia can loose such advantage for foreign capital as low wages and repeat the way of Spain where 
GDP growth rates and FDI fell sharply in the period from 2000 to 2004. GDP rates in Spain fell from 
4.5 % to 2.8 % and FDI from nearly $40 billion to the level less than $6 billion in 2000-2004. See 
Business Week 2005, May 30, for details. 
44
 This is the answer of about 50 % of respondents from industrial companies. See [15], P. 600; 
Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No.165. This is not absolutely correct now since the Russian 
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economy.45 The base for optimism can be created by 18 % of companies where 
investments in innovations are growing with rates more than 10 % a year. Usually 
they are average-scale46 companies and attempt to enter the world markets by creating 
joint ventures with foreign partners or competing directly with foreign producers.47 
2.  The outside world as a market for Russian goods and services 
Today, export plays an important role in the Russian economy (see Tables 
13 and 14). Russia exports more than 1/2 of its oil and oil products, more than 1/3 of 
natural gas, practically all non-ferrous metals48, more than 20 % of ferrous metals, and 
about 1/2 of mineral fertilizers. 
At the same time the outside world becomes more and more one of the 
serious source of inflation in Russia. In 2003-2004 export ruble prices for Russian 
goods grew with the average rate of 9.4 %.49 The doubling of this rate would increase 
the GDP growth rate by 0.1-0.2 % but, at the same time, would increase the inflation 
by 2.8-3.9 % (see Table 4). In the last 10 years the export prices’ dynamics 
contributed to about 25 % of inflation in Russia.50 
We estimated regressions of ruble export prices index and the volume of 
export (in 1995 constant prices) on the sum of real GDPs of European Community, 
USA and China, which are the main trade partners of Russia,51 (see the model 
equations (1)-(2)).52 On the basis of them we calculated the export prices and the 
volume of export elasticities to the sum of EC, USA and China GDPs (see Table 15). 
The results show, that: 
• Both export prices and the volume of Russian export depend 
essentially from the largest world economies; 
• The estimated elasticities decreased essentially in 1998, but are 
approximately stable since 2000. This means that the Russian economy became 
stronger starting from 2000, and its dependence from “whims” of these three giants 
(EC, USA and China) is a little bit lower than in the crisis of 1998. 
                                                                                                                                            
government has implemented tax privileges for innovations in 2006. But the future will show if these 
tax privileges are sufficient. 
45
 About 30-40 % of Russian companies compete neither with national nor with foreign companies. 
About 30 % of them sell on regional markets and 20 % on very “narrow”, “niche” markets that are not 
interesting to global competitors. See Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, N. 146. The review article in 
Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No.165 argues that the crucial point for enhance of innovation is 
competition at first and not tax privileges. But the data described there relates to developed countries 
and the Russian situation is quite different. 
46
 Companies with 200-500 employees. 
47
 Experts estimate that 29 % of such companies are innovative. The share of innovative companies in 
the group of those who are planning to enter the world market and competing with the import directly 
is estimated on the level of 9 %. See Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No.165. 
48
 For the data about the export of non-ferrous metals see Izvestiya, 2002, November, 2003, January 24. 
49
 Author’s calculations on the data basis from [1] and [6]. Let us mention also the leap in the export 
price index in 1999 (the dummy variable D99 in equation (1)). 
50
 See [10], P. 135. 
51
 This sum (a regressor) is evaluated in US dollars; the set is taken for ten years (1995-2004). 
52
 All results of econometric estimations in this paper are presented in Supplement 2. 
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The rapid growth of the China’s economy creates a strong potential 
demand for such Russian goods as energy,53 metals,54 construction materials, and 
lumber. The total Russian export to China increased from $3.5 billion in 1999 to 
$10.1 billion in 2004.55 
3.  The outside world as a source of goods and services for Russia 
The share of import in total resources of the Russian economy56 declines 
steadily after its splash in 1998-99 (see Table 16). The econometric equations (3) – 
(5) show: 
• a strong dependence of import both in current and in constant ruble 
prices from real GDP and inflation in Russia; the latter demonstrates the positive 
influence of strengthening ruble on the physical volume of import; 
• that import helps to decrease inflation as it increases the volume of 
total resources; that means that import limitations strengthen the inflation and limit  
the people’s wealth.57 
In Table 17 elasticities of import volume are given in constant 1995 ruble 
prices on real GDP and GDP deflator.58 One can see that they decline since 1999. In 
Table 18 the elasticity of GDP deflator on the volume of total resources is given; it 
also declines since 1998. All these facts demonstrate decline of the relative role of 
import in the Russian economy. Its development is more and more determined by 
internal factors and, particularly, by the internal demand.59 
But, at the same time, in some points the dependence of the Russian 
economy from import is significant (see Table 19). It concerns both consumer and 
investment goods. In the latter group it is especially significant for machine-tools 
since its national production is in crisis.60 The Russian government recently allowed 
importing about 700 items unique for the Russian economy in duty-free regime. As a 
result, a share of equipment in the total Russian import increased up to 45 % in the 
first half of 2006.61 The mass modernization of the equipment park in the Russian 
                                                 
53
 For example, in 2005 the oil consumption in China increased by 2.5 %, while in EC – only by 0.7 %, 
and in the USA it decreased by 0.2 %. See Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 150. The demand in 
China for energy is exaggerated by its reliance on coal and low efficiency of energy consumption; see 
Business Week, 2005, April 11. The China’s government expects that country’s energy consumption 
would double by 2020 (see Business Week, 2005, June 20). 
54
 For example, the “EvrazHolding” – the Russian “Number One” steelmaker, exports 50 % of its 
output particularly in China and other East Asian markets. 
55
 This increase is 2.9 times, whereas the total Russian export has increased only 2.4 times. See [15], P. 
700, 702. 
56
 Total resources are calculated as GDP, plus import, minus export. 
57
 For example, after introducing of meat quotas in 2003 the retail prices for meat increased by 19.5 % 
in 2004: it is 1.5 times larger than the average retail price index. The prices for sugar whose import is 
subject to quotas and duties increased 2.16 times in 2000-2004. At the same time, the average retail 
price index increased only 1.9 times. 
58
 Calculations are fulfilled on the basis of equation (4). 
59
 To support this fact, let us note that in the first six months of 2006 real disposable incomes of 
householders grew by 11 %, whereas only they grew by 8.5 % in the same period of 2005. See 
Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 137. 
60
 The share of Russian producers in this market is less than 20 % but the demand for new equipments 
grows and is estimated in $ 1-1.5 billion. See Kommersant –  DAILY, 2006, No. 14; No. 55. 
61
 In comparison with 41 % in the same period of 2005. 
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economy that began in this year62 increased not only import but national production 
too.63 
4.  Russia as a source of goods and services 
The results presented in Table 20 show that Russia is still interesting to 
the outside world, first of all, as a source of oil and gas, mineral fertilizer, metals and 
lumber. And the share of oil and products in the total export is growing.64 With the 
adequate investments and technologies the oil extraction in Russia can be trebled. The 
export of Russian natural gas constitutes about 20 % of gas consumption of 15 EC 
countries and about 2/3 of Central European gas consumption.65 There is a good 
chance that the role of Russia as a source of world energy will increase in the nearest 
years (see Table 21).66 
The world demand for electric energy will continue to increase in the 
nearest future67 mainly because of rapid growth of the China economy. That means 
that Russia has a good potential for its export. It can boost electric energy production 
by 50 % up to 2020,68 but it demands a serious investment both in electric energy and 
gas industry.69 Without it Russia will not only be unable to export, but will suffer 
from its shortage just in the next few years as a result of quick growth of the internal 
demand.70 The other crucial condition is an abolishing of price subsidies that now 
covers about 75 % of the internal energy consumption.71 
Under global forest destruction Russia preserved its forest area and wood 
reserves. But its share in the world lumber and paper trade is rather small (see Table 
22). Russia needs to export finished goods, not raw lumber, and growth of the world 
demand on paper and furniture gives it a good chance in this field. 
Soil erosion, the obsolescence of water reserves and crop area reduction 
throughout the world enhance the future grain export from Russia (see table 23). As a 
result of agricultural crisis of 1980s – 1990s, now there is has a lot of free land, most 
under bushes and grasses. The mineral fertilizer consumption per hectare decreased 
3.7 times since 1985. That means that if Russia boosts cropland, mineral fertilizer 
consumption and yields there will be a good potential in grain production and 
export.72 
                                                 
62
 Due to economic growth and ruble strengthening. 
63
 Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 137. 
64
 It can be explained partially by measures of foreign governments against the Russian non-energy 
export and investments of Russian companies abroad. 
65
 See [12]. 
66
 According to the International Energy Agency’s forecast of the world energy demand will increase 
up to 2030, and the share of oil will be about 2/3 of it. That means that the role of Russia as the world 
supplier of energy will stay high. See also [2], [7]. 
67
 See [7]. 
68
 Source: [8], [9]. 
69
 As additional capacity, the electric energy sector is planned to be based on gas consumption. See 
[12], P. 242-309 about the Russian electric energy industry reform. 
70
 See the interview by A. Chubais in Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 163. In the field of attraction 
of foreign capital into electric energy industry Russia may use an experience of India (see Business 
Week, 2005, May 23). 
71
 Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 165. 
72
 In 2003 the Russian grain export attained the level of $1 billion, though in 1982 the USSR was the 
greatest grain importer in the world. 
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The growing world demand for meat could help it also if one takes into 
account: 
• the obsolescence of world pastures; 
• the development of feeding technologies based on grain; 
• the increase of the share of poultry in the world meat production. 
The future grain export from Russia can be limited by the increase of its 
own meat production while today it is a large meat importer. From Table 23 one can 
see that the pasture land decreased by 15 %, but the total head of cattle decreased 2.6 
times, hogs 2.9 times, sheep and goats 3.6 times since 1985.73 That is, the pressure of 
cattle stock on pasture areas decreased sharply. If Russia restores its lost pastures and 
livestock, and increase the productivity of both grain and livestock production it will 
be able to fill in not only internal but also some part of the world demand for meat. 
The increasing world demand for grain and meat and the reduction of the 
land productivity in many countries enhances the Russian mineral fertilizer export. 
But it also has its own limits due to earlier discussed problems of the Russian 
potential grain and meat production. Besides, some countries limit the mineral 
fertilizer export from Russia by quotas and duties. 
5.  Russia as a market 
The share of Russia in the world import is only 1.1 %. It is much less than 
the share of developed countries (see Table 24). But, nevertheless, Russia becomes 
more and more interesting as a buyer. Why it is so? 
First of all, let us note that the share of household consumption in the 
Russian GDP (Average Propensity to Consume, APC) and its Marginal Propensity to 
Consume (MPC) are still relatively low,74 (see Table 25 and equation (6)).75 But quick 
growth of households’ incomes and expenditures (see Tables 26 and 27) provides a 
good chance for further growth of consumption.76 The Russian share in the world 
import, though still low, increased 2.2 times in the period 1999-2004.77 
Quick progress of consumer credits will also enhance the Russian 
consumer demand. Now only 23 % of Russians take consumer credits to purchase 
goods and 93 % never took credits for urgent needs.78 Only one person per 100 
                                                 
73
 Such tremendous decrease of the cattle head in the new Russian history took place only in the period 
of collectivization 1929-1933. 
74
 Low MPC can be explained by: 
• people’s fears about future; 
• shortage of cheap and high-quality goods; 
• deferred demand estimated in bounds from $40 billion to $80 billion (see [12], P. 329) – that 
can be a result of two factors mentioned before; 
• high share of foreign demand in GDP (see Table 13). 
75
 See equation (6) is the consumption function. From this equation one can see that the average ratio 
increases steadily. 
76
 Symbolic example: in 1996 “Vimpelcom”, a mobile phone company, had 45000 subscribers; in 2005 
it had 33 million of them, 733 times more. See Business Week, 2005, July 4. 
77
 And as a particular example, the share of import cars in total cars purchases increased up to 25 % 
only in 2005. See Kommersant - DAILY, 2006, No. 17. For example, “Hyundai” plans to boost its 
Russian sales from almost negligible level in 2002 to 100 thousands in 2006. See Business Week, 
2005, June 20. 
78
 See Izvestiya, 2006, April 21-23. 
 10 
persons has a credit card in Russia.79 But, at the same time, consumer credits in 
Russia are 2 times more profitable than the analogous credits in Western Europe80 and 
since January 1999 the sum of these credits increased 121 times in nominal and about 
30 times in real terms.81 
6.  Russia as a source of investment income 
In Table 28 one can find ratios of Foreign Investment to Gross Revenue 
(FI/PQ), and such indicators as Profit Margins (PM) and Return on Assets (ROA) in 
different Russian industries. In Table 29 these indices are ranked. The corresponding 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient between FI/PQ and PM is equal to 0.775 and 
between FI/PQ and ROA it is estimated on the level of 0.786, both are significant. 
These estimations mean that: 
• foreign investment is directed mainly to the highest profitable 
industries of the Russian economy;82 
• there exist some potential sectors for future foreign investment where 
FI/PQ rank is essentially lower than those of PM and ROA (they are the electric 
energy sector, first of all, and construction materials production, to some degree). 
 
7.  Risks of Russia in relations with the outside world 
There are different types of structural weakness of Russia in relations with 
the outside world. 
1. The Russian business regularly meets different limitations, anti-
dumping quotas and duties levied by foreign governments.83 
2. Russian export is still raw-materials-oriented in 80 % (see Table 20). 
Within industry groups the raw materials also predominate.84 
3. Russia has very few industries with Revealed Comparative 
Advantages (RCA) (see Table 30). At the same time, Russia has serious 
disadvantages in such fields as machinery, cars, consumer electronics, medical & 
pharmaceutical goods, meat and meat products. And what is much the worse, Russia 
looses its advantages and, on the contrary, its disadvantages are strengthening, except 
of oil and its products (see Table 31). 
                                                 
79
 In comparison with 2.5 cards per person in the USA. See Business Week, 2004, October 4, P.56. 
80
 See Business Week, 2003, September 1. 
81
 This is the author’s calculations based on the data from [1]. 
82
 Let us note that top four sectors in the foreign investment rank - ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, 
fuel industry and communications - have PM of more than 30 % and ROA of 12-15 % (the latter index 
is above 30 % in  ferrous metallurgy). 
83
 So, at the beginning of 2004 there were 93 quotas and 57 of them were antidumping quotas. Around 
60 % of them related to steel production, 25 % – to chemicals (see [12], P. 165). As a measure to 
overcome this limits, the Russian business actively invests abroad in the last period of time, only in 
2005 these investments are estimated on the level of $13.3 billion. They try to “lock the chain” and buy 
selling companies in developed countries, raw material suppliers and Local Distribution Companies 
(LDCs). 
84
 For example, in the group “lumber and paper” the share of non-processed lumber is 60 %. As a result 
of such structure, the value of the Russian export in this group is equal to $7 billion, whereas in Finland 
it is $11 billion due to more favorable structure. See Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 137 and [15], P. 
704. Besides, Russia looses about 20-30 % of the value of this export group only because many 
Russian lumber companies have no ecological certification by the Forest Care Council. 
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4. Russia crucially needs to diversify its country structure of export (see 
Table 32). For example, 100 % of Russian energy is exported to Europe.85 This is 
explainable since the cost of transportation to Europe is the lowest one and the prices 
are higher than, for example, in China. Experts forecast that even Russia will realize 
all its investment projects of construction oil and gas pipelines in Asian-Pacific region 
it will export there only 20 % of its oil and 15 % of its gas up to year 2015.86 
5. A serious threat to the development of Russia is high energy intensity 
of its GDP.87 Production of metals and mineral fertilizer in Russia is even more 
energy intensive than the average GDP energy intensity and that damages its positions 
in the world markets of these products. 88 
6. Another danger comes from substitutes of the Russian export which 
develop quickly in the outside world. For energy it is wind, solar and hydrogen 
sources,89 for metals it is metal scrap, and for lumber, paper and plywood – waste 
paper. 
7. A growing part of Russian companies suffer from strengthening 
competition both on foreign and national levels (see Table 33). The most serious 
competition is in such markets as products of chemicals and petrochemicals, machine 
building, lumber and paper, construction materials, light, food & beverages industry.90 
And if we consider the share of wages in gross revenue as an indicator of 
competitive strength we can conclude that it worsens for majority of Russian 
industries (see Table 34).91 
                                                 
85
 See Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 165. 
86
 See Kommersant – DAILY, 2006, No. 165. 
87
 It is 2-3 times greater than those in developed countries. 
88
 Just the same is inherent to the quickly growing China economy. In the past, China was a moderate 
exporter of oil. Now it is one of the largest importers. 
89
 Worldwide, the average annual growth of wind power capacity was 28 % in 1999-2004 and 
amounted 48000 megawatts. Near 3/4 of it is in Europe (now the single consumer of the Russian 
energy export) where governments have considered investments into renewable energy sources as a 
priority. Europe gets 2.5 % of its electricity from wind power sources, which is more than twice the 
corresponding proportion in the USA. But in Europe the wind power still costs $0.07-S0.1 per kwh 
compared with $0.04 from gas-fired or nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, the cost of the wind energy 
has been falling 3-5 % a year since 1980s. Spain supplies 6 % of its overall power supply from wind 
sources (Business Week, 2005, July 11). 
The cost of the wind energy in the USA now is $0.03-$0.05 per kwh making it competitive with 
conventional sources. It declined 3 times since 1990. The solar energy is still 3-5 times as costly as 
conventional sources though its cost also declined about 3 times since 1990. Anyway, the American 
Wind Energy Association estimates that the US wind power capacity increased by 37 % and the solar 
power capacity by 30 % in 2005 (see Business Week, 2005, July  4). 
90
 Some industries diminish their production under the pressure of foreign competition. See, for 
example, Kommersant – DAILY, No. 137, concerning the slump in consumer electronics in Russia. 
91
 Here the electric energy, coal, oil processing and ferrous metallurgy are the exceptions. 
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8.  Conclusions 
 
To adapt to the quickly changing outside world Russia should take several 
steps. 
1. To liberalize the labor migration conditions, to legitimate the existing 
migrants and to help the internal migrants. 
2. To soften the limits for foreign investments, to provide them more 
effective interregional and inter-industry distribution, to provide real support to 
foreign investors. 
3. To attract national and foreign capital in such advanced and important 
fields as electric energy, gas, railroads, lumber and paper, and agriculture.92 
4. To promote further support of import of unique investment goods. 
5. To give adequate privileges to national innovative companies. 
6. To protect national exporters, mostly, those of non-raw materials. 
7. To change the structure of comparative advantage, to remodel the 
product and the country export structure by means of government and private 
investment in innovations, and to support those exporters who find new markets. 
8. To decrease the energy intensity of the economy by support of 
investment in energy-saving technologies. 
9. To abolish the most inflation-producing, wealth-decreasing and 
excessive import limitations. 
 
 
                                                 
92
 These investments should be based on ecologically sustainable technologies. 
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SUPPLEMENT 1 
 
 
Table 1. Labor force dynamics in Russia, 1995 – 2005, mln. people. 93 
 
Indicator 1995 2000 2005 
People younger than workable age 34,3 29,6 24,1 
People in workable age 84,3 87,2 90,2 
People older than workable age 29,9 30,1 29,2 
Economically active population 70,9 71,5 73,4 
Employed 64,1 64,5 67,2 
Unemployed 6,8 7,0 6,2 
 
Table 1a. The structure of the Russian labor force dynamics, 1995 – 2005,%.94 
 
Indicator 1995 2000 2005 
People younger than workable age as a share of total population 23,1% 20,1% 16,8% 
People in workable age as a share of total population 56,8% 59,4% 62,9% 
People older than workable age as a share of total population 20,1% 20,5% 20,3% 
Economically active population as a share of people in workable 
age 84,1% 82,0% 81,4% 
Employed as a share of economically active population 90,4% 90,2% 91,6% 
Unemployed as a share of economically active population 9,6% 9,8% 8,4% 
 
                                                 
93
 Source: [15], P.81, 139. 
94
 Source: Table 1. 
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Table 2. Marginal Revenue of Labor (MRL) and Average Gross Per Employee 
(W), in the 4th quarter, in a year scale.95 
 
Year MRL thousands rubles, current 
prices, year scale  
Gross nominal average wages per 
employee, thousands rubles, annual 
scale (W)96 
1995 24,1 13,3 
1996 30,9 18,3 
1997 35,7 21,3 
1998 44,9 22,1 
1999 79,9 37,3 
2000 111,9 53,7 
2001 133,8 69,1 
2002 162,8 86,9 
2003 193,6 104,7 
2004 250,5 127,2 
 
Table 3. Ratio MRL/W and net migration in Russian federal districts.97 
 
Federal district MRL/W, 2003. Net migration, thousands 2004  
Central 1,40 83 
North – Western 1,39 6 
Southern 1,45 -13 
Volga 1,51 -24 
Urals 1,56 -3 
Siberia 1,37 -26 
Far Eastern 1,17 -22 
Russia average 1,41 0 
 
Table 4. Model imitation results. 
 
Parameter Change GDP annual growth 
rate reaction 
The inflation annual 
rate reaction 
Labor Increase of growth rate 
by 1 % annually 
Increase by 0.6-0.7 
% 
Decrease on 0.2-0.5 % 
Foreign direct 
investment 
Growth rate doubling Increase by 0.5-0.6 
% 
Increase by 1.5-2.0 % 
Export prices Growth rate doubling Increase by 0.1-0.2 
% 
Increase by 2.8-3.9 % 
 
                                                 
95
 See [10], P. 125. 
96
 The data for wages here are taken from the National accounts statistics. 
97
 The production function and MRL are estimated on the panel data for 65 regions of Russia for 2000-
2003. Moscow and St. Petersburg and some other regions are excluded from the sample. Net migration 
is calculated by the author on the basis of the data from [15], P. 133. 
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Table 5. Main reasons impeding foreign investment in Russia. Ranked in the 
CSFI questionnaire of foreign investors.98 
 
Rank Reason 
1 Corruption 
2 Administrative restrictions 
3 “Selective” legal practice 
4 Inadequate laws 
5 Problems with visas and job permissions 
6 Shortcomings in corporate governance and companies’ transparency 
 
Table 6. Answers of 102 actual foreign investors on the CSFI questionnaire about 
their plans in Russia.99 
 
 2005 2006 
Plan to extend operations in Russia 78 % 94 % 
Plan to increase the volume of investment 71 % 91 % 
 
Table 7. Russian regions with the greatest level of foreign investment and 
marginal revenue on capital (MRK).100 
 
Region Foreign  
investment  
attracted, 
2004, 
$million 
Rank Region MRK Rank 
Moscow City 15357 1 Moscow City Abolished 
from the 
sample 
 
Tumen 5833 2 Bashkortostan 0,233 1 
Sakhalin 3927 3 Krasnoyarsk 0,230 2 
Moscow oblast 1829 4 Omsk 0,227 3 
Krasnoyarsk 1621 5 Sakhalin 0,226 4 
Vologda 1108 6 Nizhnii 
Novgorod 
0,224 5 
Lipetsk 1102 7 Orel 0,219 6 
Samara 1098 8 Lipetsk 0,214 7 
Omsk 1086 9 Tomsk 0,210 8 
St. Petersburg 
City 
985 10 Tatarstan 0,206 9 
Sakha 834 11 Kaliningrad 0,206 10 
Chelyabinsk 683 12 Vologda 0,204 11 
Tatarstan 596 13 Krasnodar 0,202 12 
 
                                                 
98
 The Russian Committee for Support of Foreign Investment (CSFI). Source: Kommersant – DAILY, 
2005, No. 39. 
99
 The Russian Committee for Support of Foreign Investment (CSFI). Source: Kommersant – DAILY, 
2006, No. 72. 
100
 The data about foreign investment are taken from [15], P. 671-672; the Marginal Revenue on 
Capital (MRK) calculated by the author from the production function estimated on the panel data on 
Russian regions for  2000-2003. 
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Table 8. Ratio of investment into property, plant & equipment to GDP in 
different countries, 2003, %. The OECD calculations.101 
 
Country Parameter 
Russia 18 
OECD average 21 
Mexico 19 
Rep. of Korea 27 
China 42 
Malaysia 23 
Thailand 23 
 
Table 9. The ratio of investment in property, plant & equipment to the level of 
property, plant & equipment (I/K) and to GDP in current prices (I/PQ) 1995-2004 
(on the 4th quarter).102 
 
Year I/K I/PQ 
1995 0,008 0,149 
1996 0,007 0,166 
1997 0,007 0,159 
1998 0,007 0,127 
1999 0,016 0,178 
2000 0,023 0,212 
2001 0,023 0,218 
2002 0,022 0,206 
2003 0,022 0,212 
2004 0,025 0,206 
 
Table 10. Innovations in Russia and other countries.103 
 
Parameter Russia European 
Community 
USA Japan 
The utilization of innovation ideas 
and projects, %. 
8-10  62 95 
The percent of R&D fulfilled by 
companies, %. 
6 65 75 71 
 
Table 11. The amount of new production technologies created in Russia.104 
 
Year Parameter 
1997 996 
2000 688 
2003 821 
2004 676 
 
                                                 
101
 Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Source: [12], P. 105. 
102
 Source: [15], P. 336 [1], and authors calculations. 
103
 Source: Kommersant – DAILY, 2005, No. 212. 
104
 Source: [15], P. 594-595, 599. 
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Table 12. The share of expenditure on technological innovations in the gross 
industrial revenues, in %.105 
 
Year Parameter 
2000 1,0 
2001 1,1 
2002 1,3 
2003 1,3 
2004 1,1 
 
Table 13. Export, import, and net export as a share of Russian GDP, in %.106 
 
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Net export 
20,0% 12,7% 10,8% 11,3% 12,3% 13,6% 
Export 
44,1% 36,9% 35,3% 35,2% 34,5% 35,1% 
Import 
24,0% 24,2% 24,5% 23,8% 22,2% 21,6% 
 
                                                 
105Source: [14], P. 20, 425, and author’s calculations. 
106
 Source [6], and author’s calculations. 
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Table 14. Export as a share of production of several products in Russia, 2004, in 
%.107 
 
Product Export as a share of production 
Fish 38% 
Wheat 10% 
Iron core 18% 
Crude oil 58% 
Oil products 55% 
Natural gas 34% 
Ammonia 27% 
Nitrogenous mineral fertilizer 28% 
Potassium mineral fertilizer 49% 
Mixed mineral fertilizer 54% 
Tires 36% 
Plywood 64% 
Cellulose 32% 
Paper 66% 
Cotton fabric 19% 
Pig iron 11% 
Steel rolled metal 20% 
Iron rolled metal 22% 
Metal pipes 27% 
Excavators 31% 
Bulldozers 33% 
Autoloader 54% 
Cargo wagons 21% 
Tractors 90% 
Buses 14% 
 
Table 15. Export prices and volume of export elasticities to the sum of EC, USA 
and China real GDPs.108 
 
Year Export prices elasticity Export volume elasticity 
1998 4,34 0,61 
1999 2,71 0,46 
2000 2,47 0,45 
2001 2,64 0,47 
2002 2,31 0,40 
2003 2,54 0,49 
2004 2,39 0,45 
 
                                                 
107
 Source: [15], P. 707-709, 396-431, and author’s calculations. 
108
 Source: equations (1)-(2). 
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Table 16. Import as a share of total resources (GDP, plus import, minus export) 
in the Russian economy, in %.109 
 
Year A share of import in total sources 
1998 33,4% 
1999 33,0% 
2000 29,0% 
2001 27,3% 
2002 28,4% 
2003 27,1% 
2004 25,6% 
  
Table 17. Elasticity of import volume in constant 1995 prices to real GDP and 
GDP deflator.110 
 
Year Elasticity on GDP Elasticity on GDP deflator 
1998 1,487 0,823 
1999 1,437 1,145 
2000 1,122 1,078 
2001 1,025 1,066 
2002 0,929 1,058 
2003 0,844 1,002 
2004 0,721 0,970 
 
Table 18. Elasticity of GDP deflator to the volume of total resources.111 
 
Year Elasticity 
1998 -0,155 
1999 -0,110 
2000 -0,099 
2001 -0,094 
2002 -0,087 
2003 -0,085 
2004 -0,077 
 
                                                 
109
 Sources [6], [1], and author’s calculations. Calculations are fulfilled in current prices.  
110
 Source: equation (4). 
111
 Source: equation (5). 
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Table 19. The structure of the Russian import, 2004, in %.112 
 
Food and agricultural  products 18,3% 
Mineral products 4,0% 
Chemical products 15,8% 
Among them:  
Medicine 3,4% 
Plastic, etc. 3,4% 
Lumber and paper 3,8% 
Textile, footwear 4,3% 
Metals 8,0% 
Among them:  
Ferrous metals and their products 5,8% 
Equipment and means of transport 41,2% 
Among them:  
Cars 6,8% 
 
Table 20. The main export goods of Russia as a share of total export, 2004, in 
%.113 
 
Mineral products 57,8% 
Among them:  
Crude oil 32,1% 
Oil products 10,6% 
Natural gas 12,0% 
Chemical products 6,6 % 
Lumber and paper 3,9% 
Metals and metal products 20,2% 
Among them:  
Ferrous metals 9,3% 
Nickel 1,7% 
Aluminium 2,3% 
Equipment, tools and cars 7,8% 
 
Table 21. Russia as a source of world energy resources.114 
 
Oil reserves > 200 billion barrels 13-17 % of world investigated 
reserves 
Oil production 7.7 million barrels per day 10 % of world production 
Oil export 4 million barrels per day 13 % of world export 
Natural gas reserves 47 trillion of cubic meters 27 % of world investigated  
Reserves 
Natural gas production 633 billion of cubic meters 22 % of world production 
Natural gas export 200 billion of cubic meters 30 % of world export 
                                                 
112
 Source: [15], P.705, 707-709; and author’s calculations. 
113
 See [15], P.704, 707-709; and author’s calculations. 
114
 Sources: [7]; [12], P. 210-221; Business Week, 2004, 22 November; 2005, February 28; [15], P. 
399, 708. 
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Table 22. Russia as a source of world wood resources.115 
 
Parameter Value Share of global, % 
Forest area, million hectares 809 20 
Wood reserves, billion of cubic meters 80 16 
Lumber and paper export, $billion 7 5 
 
Table 23. Russian agricultural potential.116 
 
Indicator 1985 2004 
Agricultural land ha per person 1.5 1.3 
The same in the worlds, average  0.8 
Arable land, million hectare 131 117 
Share of global  8.3 % 
Pastures, million hectares, 2004 83 71 
Share of global:  2.1 % 
Grain yield, metric ton per ha 1.30 1.88 
Ratio to Canada grain yield:  70 % 
Mineral fertilizer kg per ha of 
arable land 
85 23 
In % to world average  23 % 
Cattle, million heads 59.6 23.0 
Hogs, million heads 39.0 13.4 
Sheep and goats 63.4 17.8 
Gain in total factor productivity, 
1981-2000, in % per year117 
 3.3 
 
Table 24. The share of Russia in the world import, 2004, in %.118 
 
Russia 1,1 
Belgium 4,0 
England 6,3 
Germany 10,0 
Canada 3,8 
Netherlands 3,9 
Korea 3,1 
China 5,7 
Italy 4,1 
USA 21,2 
France 6,2 
Japan 6,3 
 
Table 25. The share of household consumption in GDP: Russia, USA and 
Germany, 2004, in %.119 
 
Russia 48 
Germany 59 
USA 70 
                                                 
115
 See [15],  P. 66; 704; [3]; and author’s calculations. 
116
 Sources: [15], P. 437; 458, 793; [3]; and author’s calculations. 
117
 Estimated in [3]: “The State of Food and Agriculture”, 2005, Table A8. 
118
 Sources: [15], P. 807; and author’s calculations. 
119
 Sources: [18]; [5]; [6]. 
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Table 26. Average incomes per capita and purchases of durables  
in Russia (thousands), 1999 and 2004.120 
 
 1999 2004 Increase, times 
Average income  
per capita, $ per year 
737 2760 3,7 
Purchases of:    
TV 2205 5311 2,4 
Among them: colored 1756 4858 2,8 
Tape recorders 875 1637 1,9 
Fridges 1951 3368 1,7 
Washing machines 1200 2885 2,4 
Vacuum cleaners 1309 3039 2,3 
Cars 1025 1311 1,3 
 
Table 27. Purchases of goods in Russia, the Business Week data.121 
 
Indicator March 2000 March 2004 Increase, 
times 
Cellular phones, million 1.4 36.2 25,9 
Cinema tickets, $million 10 140 14,0 
Consumer credits outstanding, $billion 1.02 10.98 10,8 
Notebooks 41700 312000 7,5 
Imported cars 43000 203000 4,7 
Credit cards outstanding, millions 5 21 4,2 
Retail trade turnover, $billion 69 135 2,0 
Middle class, % of answers 22 % 36 % 1,6 
 
                                                 
120
 Sources: [15], P. 187, 545; and author’s calculations. 
121
 Business Week, 2004, May 31, P. 55. 
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Table 28. The ratio of foreign investment to gross revenue (FI/PQ), profit margin 
(PM) and return on assets (ROA) in the Russian economy, 2004, in %.122 
 
Industry FI/PQ PM ROA 
Total 3,2 13,2 8,5 
Among them:    
Industry 4,9 17,9 10,5 
Among them:    
Electric energy 0,2 9,8 3,6 
Fuel industry123 10,7 30,7 13,5 
Ferrous metallurgy124 7,3 36,2 34,3 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 12,6 36,2 15,5 
Chemical 4,6 12,2 8,6 
Machine-building and 
metal-working 2,4 
7,0 3,4 
Lumber and paper 7,3 7,1 3,6 
Construction materials 1,7 10,1 7,7 
Light industry 1,2 3,4 0,6 
Food & beverages 2,2 8,1 6,7 
Construction 0,8 5,0 3,0 
Communications 7,8 32,9 12,1 
Trade & restaurants 6,4 12,7 12,1 
 
Table 29. Ranks of ratio of foreign investment to gross revenue (FI/PQ), profit 
margin (PM) and return on assets (ROA) in the Russian economy, and Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient.125 
 
Industry FI/PQ PM ROA 
Electric energy 13 8 9 
Fuel industry 2 4 3 
Ferrous metallurgy 4 2 1 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 1 1 2 
Chemical 7 6 6 
Machine-building and 
metal-working 8 
11 11 
Lumber and paper 5 10 10 
Construction materials 10 7 7 
Light industry 11 13 13 
Food & beverages 9 9 8 
Construction 12 12 12 
Communications 3 3 4 
Trade & restaurants 6 5 5 
Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient of 
FI/PQ with PM and 
ROA 
 
0,775 0,786 
                                                 
122
 Sources: [15], P. 323, 474, 510, 535, 641, 671; [14], P. 26-29, 375, 395, and author’s calculations. 
The calculations include total volume of foreign investment, not only direct, but also portfolio and 
“other” investment. 
123
 Figures Include oil extraction, oil processing, gas and coal extraction. About 99 % of foreign 
investment in fuel industry goes to oil extraction. 
124
 One of the reasons of high profitability of metal sector is its intensive consolidation. 
125
 Source: Table 27. 
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Table 30. Coefficients of Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCA) and 
Disadvantages.126 
 
Item 1997 2003 
Advantages 
Oil and oil products 23.8 38.9 
Gas natural and synthetic 18.3 13.7 
Non-ferrous metals 8.3 5.2 
Iron and steel 5.7 3.0 
Lumber 2.0 2.4 
Disadvantages 
Transport cars -2.5 -6.6 
General industrial equipment -4.5 -5.9 
Electric equipment -2.2 -5.3 
Special equipment -3.4 -4.8 
Medical & pharmaceutical products -2.5 -4.4 
Meat & meat products -4.1 -4.1 
Fruits & vegetables -2.7 -3.4 
Paper, plywood -0.6 -2.0 
Perfume, washing materials, etc. -1.1 -2.0 
 
Table 31. The greatest increases and decreases of RCAs in the Russian 
economy.127 
 
RCA Item 
1997 2003 
Increase or 
decrease 
Oil and oil products 23.8 38.9 15.1 
Gas natural and synthetic 18.3 13.7 -4.6 
Transport cars -2.5 -6.6 -4.1 
Electric equipment -2.2 -5.3 -3.1 
Non-ferrous metals 8.3 5.2 -3.1 
Iron and steel 5.7 3.0 -2.7 
 
Table 32. Country structure of the Russian export, 1995-2004, in %.128 
 
Country 1995 2004 
CIS 18,6 16,1 
Other than CIS 81,4 83,8 
Among them   
ЕС-25 43,3 50,3 
China 4,3 5,6 
USA 5,5 3,6 
 
                                                 
126
 Source: [12], P. 188-189. RCAi = (Xi/ΣXk – Mi/ΣMk)*100, where Xi and Mi are export and import 
of good i, respectively. 
127
 Revealed Comparative Advantages (RCAs). See [12], P. 204. 
128
 Sources: [15], P. 702-703, and author’s calculations. 
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Table 33. Factors strengthening the competition on the Russian market of 
industrial goods (the frequency of answers on questionnaires, in % of total 
answers), 1996-2003.129 
 
Factor 1996 2003 
Growing volume of import goods 31 30 
Better quality of import goods 7 20 
Low prices of import goods 17 24 
Price restrains by Russian competitors 14 31 
Appearance of new Russian competitors 18 42 
 
Table 34. The share of wages in gross revenue, 1999-2004.130 
 
Industry 1999 2004 Increase (+) or decrease (-) 
Industry total 9,2% 10,1% 0,90% 
Electric energy 11,6% 10,7% -0,90% 
Fuel 8,1% 7,6% -0,50% 
Among them:    
Oil extraction 5,5% 5,9% 0,40% 
Oil processing 7,1% 5,8% -1,30% 
Gas 10,4% 12,8% 2,40% 
Coal 25,9% 19,5% -6,40% 
Ferrous metallurgy 8,1% 6,6% -1,50% 
Non-ferrous metallurgy 8,8% 12,1% 3,30% 
Chemical and petrochemical 9,5% 12,1% 2,60% 
Machine building and metal cutting 15,4% 18,6% 3,20% 
Lumber and paper 13,7% 15,5% 1,80% 
Construction materials 16,2% 16,2% 0,00% 
Light 18,9% 22,0% 3,10% 
Food and beverages 7,9% 8,9% 1,00% 
 
                                                 
129
 See [12], P. 41; 
130
 Sources: [15], P. 377-422, and author’s calculations. 
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SUPPLEMENT 2 
 
List of Variables 
 
PEXP – index of ruble prices on Russian export goods (1995 = 
1.00); 
RUSEXPCON – the volume of Russian export in fixed 1995 
ruble prices. 
WCON – the sum of GDPs of EC, USA and China in the fixed 
US 1995-dollar prices; 
D99 – dummy variable: it equals to 0 for the period 1995-98 
and equals to 1 for the period 1999-2004; 
IMCUR – Russian import in current ruble prices; 
IM – Russian import in constant 1995 ruble prices; 
Q – GDP of Russia in constant 1995 prices; 
Р – GDP deflator in Russia (1995 = 1.00); 
RRES = total resources = GDP of Russia, plus import, minus 
export (all variables are given in constant 1995 ruble prices); 
CONS – the total consumer expenditures in Russia in current 
ruble prices; 
Т – time trend; 
R2 – determination coefficient; 
DW – Durbin-Watson coefficient; 
F – Fischer’s statistics. 
Student’s t-statistics are given in brackets. 
 
 
1) Export prices equation for Russia  
 
PEXP = -3.958 + 4.81E-8(WCON)2 + 1.426D99 
                          (6.245)                       (6.401) 
R2 = 0.927 
DW = 1.827 
F = 228.8 
 
 
2) Real export equation for Russia  
 
RUSEXPCON = 758.7 + 0.0586WCON – 0.191WCON
-1 + 
6.63E-06(WCON)2                                        (4.006)                 (-6.976)                  
(6.323) 
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R2 = 0.935 
DW = 1.996 
F = 166.8 
 
 
 
3-4) Import equations for Russia 
 
IMCUR = -403.2 + 1.111Q + 65.884P 
                               (6.723)    (24.124) 
 
R2 = 0.988 
DW = 1.910 
F = 1554.2 
 
IM = -26.4 + 0.286Q + 15.292P – 52.3D99 – 2.066T 
                     (4.029)       (3.936)    (-6.122)   (-1.987) 
 
R2 = 0.868 
DW = 2.203 
F = 57.7 
 
 
 
5) Inflation equation for Russia 
 
P = 0.727+1.052P
-1 – 0.002RRES 
               (68.17)      (-2.355) 
 
R2 = 0.996 
DW = 1.896 
F = 4558.3 
 
 
6) Consumption function for the Russian economy 
 
CONS = 0.412PQ + 7.196T 
(19.364) (3.522) 
 
R2 = 0.993 
DW = 1.467 
 28 
References 
 
1. Bank of Russia. Official Internet site: www.cbr.ru. 
2. Birol, F., World Energy Prospects and Challenges. From the 
Internet site of     the International Energy Agency (IEA): 
www.iea.org. 
3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 
Official internet site: www.fao.org. 
4. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Official internet 
site: www.fdic.gov. 
5. Federal Statistic Office of Germany. Official Internet site: 
www.destatis.de. 
6. Federal Statistical Service of the Russian Federation (Rosstat). 
Official internet site: www.gks.ru. 
7. International Energy Agency (IEA). World Energy Outlook, 2004. 
8. International Energy Agency (IEA). Russia Energy Strategy, to 
2020. 
9. International Energy Agency (IEA). World Energy Outlook, 2002. 
10. Mitsek, S. A., Econometric Model of Russian Economic Growth. – 
Ekaterinburg, Liberal Arts University Press, 2006. (in Russian) 
11. Ministry of Finance of Russia. Official internet site: 
www.minfin.ru. 
12. Economic Reviews of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), Russian Federation. September 2004, 
Moscow, “Ves’ Mir”, 2005. (in Russian) 
13. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD. 
Investment Policy Review in 2004, Russian Federation. 
14. Promyshlennost’ Rossii (Industry of Russia), 2005. Moscow, 
Rosstat, 2006. (in Russian) 
15. Rossiski statisticheski ezhegodnik (Russian Statistical Annual) for 
2005. Moscow, Rosstat, 2006. (in Russian) 
16. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). World Investment Report, 2005.  
 29 
17. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD). World Investment Report, 2003. Moscow, “Ves’ 
Mir”, 2004. (in Russian) 
18. The US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis: 
www.bea.org. 
 
